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1. Introduction
Several formerly aocialiat nationa in Central and Eastern Europe have been
succeeaful ín achieving currency convertibility and domeatic price raform. In
East-Germany, the DNark has replaced the Ostmark, and pricea of goods and
servicea are dictated by market conditions in the iieat. Further east, Bulgaria
has aet a courageous example by going almost all the way to currency
convertibility and liberating almost all domestic pricea. Poland has travelled
far in the same direction, and Czechoalovakia, Hungary and Rumania also are
making substantial progress towards a comertible currency and a domestic
structure of relative pricea that reflects acarcity and coats rather than
political conaiderationa.
The progresa towarda privatization so far appears much less impressive.
Admittedly, one sees the establiahment of many privately owned small business
in almost all the formerly socialist countries, with a predictable emphasis
so far on trading companies, followed by retail trade and a variety of other
commercial services e.g. taxis and restaurants. By contrast, progress in the
privatization of the larger state-owned enterprises that dominated the
economies of central and eastern Europe seems slow and hesitant. In this essay
I try to review some of the diffícultiea that have been encountered so far in
the attempts at prívatízation, and summaríze some princíples that appear to
be important at least to this outside observer.
1 Revised text of a public lecture given in Sofia on April 4, 1991 at the
invitation of the Bulgarian Institute of Management and Administration. I am
grateful to Prof. Evka Razvigorova-Janakieva and tha staff of the Institute
for their hoapitality.2
The principal concluaions of the paper are:
e clarity about property rights has to include resolution of disputes about
taxation, in particular an end to quarrels between different units of
government about the rights to tax.
~ to achieve popular capitaliam in the sense that many citizens own a share
to a portfolio of large enterprises 1s less urgent than an ownership
structure that creates proper incentives for management and other stake-
holders in the firm.
~ allowing joint ventures with foreígners creates large incentivea for
managers in state enterprises to steal at the expenae of their companies:
freedom to deal threatens to become freedom to steal. The basic problem
here is that during the period of transition to privatization, there are
no well defined owners of the enterprise-to-be-privatized, so that
management can act on the wrong incentives.
~ macroeconomic uncertainty seems to be so pervasive, that it is risky to
try to fix the exchange rate for long periods.
The next sectíon of the paper continues with a discussion of some of the
lessons to be drawn from the experience with market reforms. In section three
I summarize some modern principles of corporate finance that seem particularly
appropríate for the privatízation of state-owned enterprises ín Central and
Eastern Europe. Finally, section four of the paper is concerned with some
macroeconomic issues.3
2. Leasons from Poland the oviet Union and E st rmanv
2.1 Slow Privatization n Pnlnnri
On January lat, 1990 Poland began a program of macroeconomic stabilizetion,
supported by the International Monetary Fund (IliF). The Poliah 21oty was fixed
at 9,500 21oty's per U.S. dollar and has been maíntaíned at the level until
the time of writing (May 1991). Also, most prices were liberated, and many
government aubaidiea were abolished in order to reduce the deficit of the
Poliah government. For reasons to be diacusaed below, these financial reforms
were not accompanied by substantial privatization of Polish state enterprises,
but a large number of new companies were set up by Polish entrepreneurs. Table
1 ahows a number of macroeconomic targets of thia atabilization program for
1990 and their realized values.
The most atriking aspect of the table is the extremely large gap between the
targets for the Polísh economy in 1990 and the outturn. Even though the
authoritiea were successful in maintaining a fixed exchange rate throughout
the year, the realized average rate of inflation deviated very substantially
from the forecast, and so did the outcomes for consumption, wages, production,
foreign trade and unemployment. Perhaps the numbers for the government budget
form an exception; the forecast - a deficit - had the wrong sign because a
surplus was realized in the government's budget, but both forecast and
realízation are relatively small numbers given the size of the Polish economy.
Such great uncertainty raises doubts about the appropriateness of fixing the
exchange rate for a long period. In fact, contínued high inflation into 1991
has contributed to a dispute within the Polish government about near term
exchange rate policy, with the Polish Planning Bureau, for example, advocating
a devaluation of the 21oty, even though this would involve a deviation from
the stabilízation policy agreed with the INF.
Such uncertainty about a possible imminent devaluation íncreases the risk
premium in domestic in[erest rates. Because the extent of a possible4
devaluation will be large, the ríak premium which ía directly related to the
product of the possible devaluation and its probability, will also be
subatantial. There are other costs associated with great uncertainty about a
posaible large diacrete move in the nominal exchange rate. F1rat, if domestic
money market and savings rates are not yet fully market-determined,
subatitution by reaidants of foreign money for domestic money ia itself a
major cause of domeatic inflation, because the demand for domeatic money falls
whilst ita aupply is not reduced. Second, further llberation of international
payments may be suspended in an attempt to artificíally increase the demand
for domestic money. Finally, and moat important, fixing the nominal exchange
rate whilat experiencing domestic inflation greatly in excess of foreign
inflation implies atrong real appreciation of the domeatlc currency. As is
well known from instances of real apprecíation ín the middle-income countries
of Latin America, strong real appreciation meana that the composition of
importa shifta from importa of investment goods to imports of conaumer goods,
whilst exports suffer from a lack of international competitiveness. Importers
and consuners of foreign produced luxury gooda exert political preasure to
maintain the fixed exchange rate, but each additional month of further real
appreciation leada to more serious distortlons in relative prices and makes
it harder for the country to trade internationally according to its
comparative advantage.
Very disappointíng so far has been the experience with privatization in
Poland. On July 13th 1990 the Polish parliament pasaed a law on privatization
which stipulated that 20 percent of the shares in large privatized s[ate
companies should be reserved for the workers. The then Polish government was
ín favour of spreading ownershíp of the remaíning 808 as widely as possíble
over the population. However, so far only B industrial corporationa have been
privatízed. Díffículties in valuing [he asseta and líabilítíes of
corporations, the lack of capital markets, and the paucity of domestic savings
have been citad as explanations for the lack of success in privatizing the
larger enterprises.
More fundamental causes, however, may be found outside of the financíal
sector. With sharply increasing nationwide unemployment, the workers as
represented by the unions may be less than keen on privatization of their own
company, reckoning that new management will try to increase labour5
productívity by cutting employment and aelling of those no-core buainesaea
that usad to be part of the enterprise - given the strong tendency towards
vertical integration under communist rule - but have no place in a more
efficient, private company. Also, both workers and management will try to
negotiate wlth the authorities about the conditions of privatization, in
particular about forgivíng company debt. Finally, a number of observers of the
Polish economy have pointed out that the transitional phase with ita unclear
demarcation of property righta in the enterprise may suit current management,
since the managers have continued tenure as atate employees but may at the
same time engage in deals ínvolving domestic atart-up companies or foreign
joint ventures without much control by owners' representatives. According to
Lipton and Sacha: "managers qulckly discovered ways to appropriate state
property by making sveetheart deals with an outside partner in a proceas that
quickly became known as "spontaneous privatization." Lewandoski and Szomburg
call the procesa "legal parasitism."...Sihile the government's overalght of
joint venturea has been atrengthened, there ia anecdotal evidence to suggest
that at least some joint venture arrangements still aerve the self-interest
of managers. Also, while new conflict-of-interest laws have been put in place
to prohibit spontaneous privatizations through sweetheart deals, the
effectiveneas of theae regulations is not yet clear" (pp. 306-307). Z
These experiences have contributed to a change of sentiment in Poland
regarding privatizatíon of the larger enterprises. It is now more generally
recognízed that giving a stake in the enterprise to the workers may make sense
as a political conceasion, but ahould remain limited for two fundamental
reasons. First, the well known argument that workers whose future íncome is
tied up to some extent wíth the fortunes of their company should not also
invest their wealth in shares of the same company. Diversifícation of the
workers' wealth calls for inveatment in other directions. Second, as shown
dramatically by the example of Yugoslavia, worker ownership or labour-managed
firms are inefficient, because the workers will try to maximize profits per
worker or capital per worker rather than total profits of the enterprise.
Hence, the workers will resist rational proposals to expand the firm because
it will dilute the profitability of the current stock of capital per worker.
Also, the labour market becomes very inefficient as older workers will require
Z David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990-II, pp. 293-342.b
new entrants to fund their pensions. Lipton and Sachs write: "From an
efficiency standpoint, it makes little senae for workers to own their own
enterprisea (or to lease the capital in their enterprises), except in the case
of small, labor-intensive operations. 1Jorker ownership or labor-management
tends to cut firms out of the capital marketa. Outside ínveatora often shun
enterprlaes 1n which workera have a controlling intereat, aince the workers
can act opportunistically to absorb all of the income of the firm in the form
of wage compensation" (pp. 309-311).
These theoretical analyses of labour-managed fírms explain why in market
economies a limited number of activities are organized predoninantly by
labour-managed firma: accountancy firms, architects, management conaultants,
sometimea symphony orchestras, all examples of firma where the amount of
capital per worker is low and most workera are professionals whose
productivity and posaíble promotions are more easily monitored by peers than
by standard management procedurea. By contrast, labour-management ia almost
non-existent in market economiea outside theae specific areas; in particular,
it ie very rare to observe successful labour-managed firms in sectors where
a large amount of capital per worker is required and production workers can
be aupervised by management uaing indicators of output and productivity.
Fortunately, public opinion in Poland appears to accept thet the origínal
objectives of substantial worker ownership combined with widespread popular
capitalism were ínappropriate. There is a growíng consensus that designing
proper incentives for management and workers is more important
(see section 3).
2.2 Lggal chaos in the Soviet Union
The Sovíet Union currently suffers from unresolved arguments between central
government and the republics over who controls policy. With net materíal
product expected to decline by 158 this year on top of an estimated 48 decline
ín 1990, the weak central government will be unable to close its budget
deficit. However, it ia dependent foz income on the republics where the
collection of tax revenues has to be organized. According to "The Economist"
(April 27th, 1991) the republics have only contributed 40 percent of what the
central government required them to hand over in first three months of 1991.7
In my view, the battle over tax revenuea and the authority to impose and
collect taxes is extremely debilitating for the Soviet Union at present and
will need to be reaolved before there ís any chance of attracting voluntary
private capital from abroad.
A recent story in the "Wall Street Journal" (Narch 21, 1991) illustrates the
current adminíairative chaos in the Soviet Union by describing the power
vacuum ín the northerly city of Archangel:
"For almost every new law isaued by the Kremlin, the Rusaian government has
paeaed its own version that amends or blocks the Soviet one. The diaputes
leave provincíal officisla uncertain about which laws, if any, to follow."
"Without a union treaty, the war of laws will continue forever," says
Sergei Semyonov, an aide to an Archangel deputy in the Russian parliament.
"Whnt we need is stability. Unfortunately, there's more noise than reason in
our politics."
"Archangel politicíans blame eome of their difflculties on the cumbersome
syatem of local administration that Hr. Gorbachev has created. The town, an
ancient White Sea port built up by Peter the Creat, is relatively amall, with
a population of 400.000. Even ao, six separate bodies all have a say in
governing it: A regional council oversees the whole Archangel area, which is
geographically bigger than France. The regional council's reaponaibilitíes
overlap, to some extent, wíth those of the Archangel Town Council and of four
separate district councila. Overall, more than 600 deputies are in these
bodies. A híerarchy of sorts does exiat, with the regional body supposedly
more powerful than the Town Council, which ín turn has more authority than the
district organizatíons. But the system often breaks down."
"Those responsible for passing Legislatíon don't have the authority to
implement it, while those charged with implementing decisions don't have the
authority to ímplement it, while those charged with implementing decisions
don't bear responsibility for making them. "The structure of power ís all
wrong," complains Alexander Driker, a deputy in the Town Councíl. The price
of tram tickets is a case in point. The town's transport system is running at
a big loss because in January the national government jacked up the wholesale
price of electricity. The town is supposed to pay the difference but doesn't
have the money. It also can't zaise ticket prices, because that falls under
the jurisdíction of the regional council, which hasn't yet consented. Faced
with a drain on the town's coffers, the executíve committee inaisted on
action. But after two days of debate ín the town assembly last month, deputíes
refused to sanction price increases; they said only the regional council could
do so. Taking matters into its own hands, the executive committee decided to
triple tram prices anyway on
April 1."
"The Kremlin has greatly íncreased prices of many goods and services bought
by the town. Facing a big deficit, the council has looked for new sources of
finance. It unilaterally set new tax rates on all factories on its territory -8
and immadiately ran into a roadblock. Local banks handlíng all the accounts
refused to transfer the new higher amounts to the town, saying Moscow hadn't
authorized them to do so. Officials have had no more luck with another ploy
to raise revenue. They decided to levy a 158 tax on some local industries over
which they are supposad to have jurisdiction. But the factories replied wíth
a curt nyet, and the order proved unenforceable. "Nobody observea the 158
tax," says Sergei Zmyotny, a shipyard official. "!iy opinion is that the
council doesn't have real power at the noment."
Before the current attempte at reform, the Soviet Union did not have a proper
system of taxation. The Ninistry of Finance decided for each branch of
induatry or even down to the level of individual enterprises how much tax was
due; there was no common tariff. In August 1986 the new law on joint ventures
with foreigners atipulated a 208 tax on profits. The Soviet government
intended to alao legislate a uniform profits tax for domeatic enterprises, but
this was never lmplamented. Currently nev forma of taxation can be impoaed by
prealdential degree, but the individual republics are buey drawing up their
own tax laws.
Local tax inspectors often are faced with two contrary tax lawa and feel
forced to make ad-hoc decisions. Soviet tax officials also still are
accustomed to ordering a company's bank to pay the tax as they have assessed
it. In sum, power still rests with officíals, and there is no clear rule of
law in the area of taxation. Until the lines of demarcation between the center
and the republics hava been clearly drawn, it aeems unlikely that the current
legal chaos in the Soviet Union will subside. In the mean tíme, legal
uncertainty will spread from the area of taxation to pricing policies for
electricity, gas, water and other state-provided goods and services. Uníts of
government that are faced with budget deficits may try to compensate by
raising prices of goods and servíces that are produced under their control,
as exemplified by the city council ín the Archangel story that tripled the
price of tram tickets.
Pervasíve legal uncertainty regarding the tax system and uncertainty about
future prices for such essentíal inputs in production as electricity, and
public transport, are severe handicaps for private enterprise. One has to fear
that a low exchange rate that makes labour cheap by international standards
cannot compensate for such fundemental business uncertainties.9
2.3 Uncertain urooert~ri~hts in East-Germanv
One should be careful when trying to generalize from experience in East
Germany to the other formerly socialist countries ín Central and Eastern
Europe. For, East Germany differed in two fundamental aspects from the other
nations: first, its citizens had the constítutional right to astablish
themselvea in the Federal Republic of Germany and to demand social services
and housing upon arrival. Once the Wall fell and this right became effective
hundreds of thousands of East German citizens voted with their feet and went
Weat. The citizena of the other formerly socialist countriea are not entitled
to automatic establishment in Western Europe, unless they apply for the
uncertain status of political refugees. Second, the Gernan government imposed
the Weat-German DMark as the sole legal currency in East Germany on July lst,
1990, hence eatabliahing a fixed exchnnge rate between East and West Cermany.
The only remaining way in whích enterprises in East Gernany can become
competitive internationally by changes in a nominal magnitude is through
decreasea in the nominal wage in East Germany or by wage subsidies fínanced
by West-German tax payera. In the other fomerly aocialiat economiea, business
can become more competitive if the exchange rate of the domeatic currency is
devalued or left free to float downwarda on the foreign exchange markets.
Nevertheless, recent events in East Germany contain one important lesson for
the other ex-socialist nationa. The "Treuhand" was establiehed to organize the
privatization of the large East--German atate enterprises. It was faced wíth
a double dilemma: should state enterprises be offered for sale as soon as
possible or first be reorganízedT Also, was ít appropriate to offer
enterprises for sale when potential legal issues regarding compensatíon of
former property owners had not yet been settled7 The first of these dilemmas
was basically up to the management of Treuhand to decide; the second issue
depended on decisions by the German parlíament regardíng compensation of
owners of property that was confiscated by the East German state.
Initially, sales were delayed because there was a preference for
reorganization before putting the state conglomerates on the market and
second, because the German government was inclined to solve the compensatíon
íssue before allowing private sales of enterprises and the land on which they
were established. In tiarch of 1991, however, the new economics minister in10
Garmany won an argument inside the German government over the reapective
priorities of settling compensation issues connected to past forced
netionalization and immediate salea of atate enterprisea. It has now been
decided that new investors will obtain the right to continue doing buainess
on diaputed property, with issuea of compensation to former owners being
settled later and separately. Solutíon of the first dilemma, reorganization
before sale, or sale first and reorganization by the new ovners ia obviously
related to serloua labour market iasues in East Germany. When the two
economiea of Western East Germany merged on July lat, 1990, wagea ín East
Germany were fixed at about a third of their level in Western Germany,
according to "The Economist" (April óth, 1991) roughly in line with relative
levals of labour productivity. However, since then wages have risen by over
SOt 1n many induatríes in the East, in order to prevent workers from
exercising their constitutional right to emigrate from East to West. These
very substantial wage risea have not been matched by productívíty gains, so
that the competitlve position of the East Gernan firma has deteriorated
sharply. This course of events doea not imply criticism of last year's
deciaion to impoae the Weat German Mark on the East German Laender and to use
a one-to-one ratio in converting wages from Ostmark to DMark, because the
presaure to equalize wage levels in East and West in order to prevent mass
emigratíon vould have existed under any exchange rate arrangement. The need
for very large subaidies on wage coata would have arisen in any event, but
unfortunately ít has been more convenient so far to pay workers to remaín
attached to their current enterprísea than to subaidize entrepreneurs who are
prepared to risk setting up new firms or taking over existing companies. But,
keeping a large part of the labour force on "short-time work" induces workers
to take a wait-and-see attitude instead of inducing them to actively search
for better opportunities" (pp. 22-23). 3
As in the case of bankruptcies in market economies, asset sales to a new
owner, if necessary combined with wiping out (part of the) existing debts, is
more effícient from a social point of view than continued operation under
previous management wi[h subsidies by the State. For, as Neumann notes "(í)
3 Manfred J.M. Neumann, German Unification: Economic Problems and
Consequences, paper prepared for Carnegie-Rochester Public Policy Conference,
April 19-20, 1991.11
tha private inveator has the atrongeat incentive to raiae the value of the
company by appropriate reconstruction and by contributing new capital, and
(11) he is likely to have the nore intimate knowledge and expertiae wíth
reapect to chooaing a promising product mix and marketíng" (p Q2),
It never made much aenae to postpone privatization until isaues of
compensation to previous ovnera had been resolved and aettled. For, the atate
owna all the land and all the larger enterprises in East Germany as well as
virtually all of the housing atock. Hence, the atate will alao be liable for
any compeneetion to be paid to previoua owners who were forced to relínquísh
their property to the previoua socialist state. Hith the state both the
current ovner and responsible for compensation, there are obvíous aocial gains
and no social losaea if property ia put to more efficient uae as soon as
possible through asaet sales to new private inveators. Not to separate issues
of future ownership from iasuea of compensation to former ownera was a aerious
error which hea contributed to the disappointingly slow pace of privatization
in East Garmany. The same prínciple would appear to apply in the other
formerly aocialiat economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The moat urgent
task ía to make the economy more efficient through privatization and private
ownership. This will broaden the future tax base and put goverswent in a
better position to eventually pay damages to owners whose property was
confiacated in the past and who are deserving of compensation.
3. Privatízation with the nron r i., ri.e
All formerly socíalist countrlea in Central and Eastern Europe wish to
prívatíze most of their Large state-owned enterprises. Private ownership will
lead to more efficient production and better use of labour, capital and
energy. Also, state ownership has often been shown to be incapable of dynamíc
efficiency, with a state-owned bus factory in Czechoslovakia, for example,
continuing to produce its price-winning bus model for thirty consecu[ive
years. Finally, economic integration of the formerly socialist natíons with
the world economy requires realistic prices which in turn means abolishing
most state subsídíes to industry. Privatlzation can be regarded as a means to
make proper relatíve prices and an industrial sector without heavy
subsidízation more likely politically.12
Both in Poland and in Czechoalovakia the debate about privntization lnitially
focused on striving towards a measure of popular capitalism.
All adult citizens vere to obtain ahares in a portfolio of large induatrial
companiea or vouchera giving the purchaser the ríght to obtain auch aharea at
some díacount from eatimated market value. Presumably public opinion felt
atrongly that nationalízed company asaeta belonged to the nation as a whole.
Also, grave and warranted concerns about environmental problems may have
pointed towarda widespread ownership of industrial assets, as an institutional
meana to promote more careful husbandry of precious environmental resources
and optimal popular aupport for coatly but more environmentally-conscious
industrial policies.
The nev Polish government of Preaident Walesa has shifted its privatization
policies. Minister Janusz Lewandowski for Ownerahip Changes wrote: "too much
stresa and energy was concentrated on public offerings, to the disadvantage
of other methoda that are posaible under the privatization law" (Wall Street
Journal, March 29, 1991). According to Minister Lewandowski, the Pollsh
government intenda to continue its attempts to achieve wideapread share
ownerahip, but now Ss more keen than before to identify a group of major
stakeholdera in the company and to ensure that theae inslders act on the
proper incentives. More worked-out proposals are to be found in the paper by
Lipton and Sachs quoted above. These authors rightly note that if ownership
of enterpriaes is too much dispersed, the many individual small owners will
have little incentive to monitor management. Hence, "the prívatization process
should avoid creating an atomistic ownership structure for the large
en[erprises, in which hundreds of thousands or millions of owners each retain
a small number of shares. Most ownership of the large enterprises should be
held by intermediary agents such as pension funds, mutual funds, or commercial
banks, or by large owners with concentrated stakes" (David Lipton and Jeffrey
Sachs, p. 317).
Copying the French experience with privatization of state owned enterprises
ín the 1980s, Lipton and Sachs advocate the search for a group of core
investors who own at least 208 of the shares. For instance, management could
take such a share in the company, paying for the shares with barrowed funds.
Minister Lewandowski in his Wall Street Journal article suggests that managers
and~or workers could pay for their signifícant share over a three to six year13
period after the firm has been valued by an independent consulting aervice.
A sígniflcant ownership stake for management if it hae been obtained with
borrowed funds would create mich better incentivea for the managera to act in
the company's beat intereata than the current syetem in Poland which tempta
the managers to engage in joint ventures with foreignara in which they have
a private lnterest or to search for other means to enrich themaelves at
company expense. An essential elenent would be that managemant doee not obtain
its share in the company for free but indeed has to borrow extenaívely in
order to purchase the aharea, poaeibly over a multi-year period.
In thia reapect, a country like Bulgaria in vhich most people own their homes
has a very significant advantage over nations were private property is much
lesa important. In Bulgarla, one should ask managera to take a mortgage on
their homes and on any other real estate they may own in order to purchase
their sharea in the companiea they manage. If the company is successful, they
will be able to pay back the loan out of future profíta; if they fail the test
of the market or do not put thelr company's intereata firat, they risk losing
their homes.
Additionally, a stake of similar size could be placed privately with either
a commercial bank or a pension fund. An outside ínvestor, such as a bank or
a pension fund, which acquires a significant stake in the company of 208 or
more, has a strong incentive to spend resources monitoring management. Lipton
and Sachs write "The Eastern European economíea should aim to develop
universal banking, as in Germany and Japan, where the commercial banks hold
stakes in corporate asaets and play active rolea ín the oversight of
enterprises. The new banks should place representatives on the corporate
boards of directors, and strengthen their capacities to participate in the
restructurings of troubled fírms. Of course, qualified banks cannot be created
at once, but it will be far easier to build up the operational capacity of a
dozen large banks (perhaps through management contracts wiih foreign banks)
than to rely on the decentralized oversight of thousands of indívidual
enterprises (pp. 318 and 319).
Proponents of a corporate financial structure for the privatized enterpríses
of Eastern Europe, that emphasízes a major stake for management paid for wíth
borrowed funds and another substential stake in the handa of a profesaionally14
managed financial inatítution, aim at creating the proper incentivea. This is
particuly important because the fornerly socialist countries lack developed
fínancial markets, a sophisticated financial press and even an indigenous
accountancy profession that ia familiar with market-based syatems of financial
accounting. Therefore, the marketable asseta of the firv should be pledged to
the bank or penaion fund that has a signifícant stake, so that thia financial
institution has a reasonable chance of recovering the full value of its
inveatment even in the event of moderately adverse developments. The managers
should pledge their personal asaeta, so as to create the proper incentives
against the growth of managerial perka - unnecassary foreign travel, blurring
of the distinctions between company property and private propezty etc. - and
to make sure that managers identify their personal businesa interests wíth
those of the company.
The proposal that management should borrow agaínst the value of its personal
asaets - a home or real estate - also applies in the case of start-up
companies. Robert Hall writes: "in every situation I know of involving a small
buainess and a bank, the bank extracts security interest in the homes and
other asaeta of the managers, which is exactly in line with this idea that
there should be a noncontingent pledge that there be no effect to the equíty
interest of the bank whatsoever. That is, the bank should get its value out
no matter what happens just as the entrepreneurs get to keep the proceeds of
their succesaes. In a start-up situation, the incentive problems are
particularly acute. If you look at the kind of a deal a venture capitalist
(the wealthholder) should make wíth the entrepreneurs, it has the following
character: the venture capitalists should have a full liquidation preference
and the principals should invest all of their personal wealth, including all
available house equity" (p. 75).`
Hall makea a case in thís paper for legislation that prevents hostile take
overs of the company during the period (3-6 years7) in which managers are
still paying off the bank loans they needed to purchase their share in the
enterprise. He "does not support the general hostílíty of finance economists
to measures that defend the corporation against hostíle takeovers. Those
` R.E. Hall, Commentary on "Financial Factors in Busíness Fluctuatíons"
in: Financial Market Volatility, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1988,
PP. 73-78.IS
measures are part of the way the managers are given effective ownership of the
internal equity."
4. Macroeconomic un rrainti a
The experiences in Poland, the Soviet Union and East Germany which were
discussed in section 2 above also carry a number of macroeconomic
lmplications. In Poland, the now available numbera for all of 1990
convincingly ahow that fixing the exchange rate for a long period does not
dellver stable domeatic pricea. Inflatíon in Poland as measured in Zloty's
amounted to 249 percent for the full year. Monthly ratea of inflatíon varied
substantially but were not yet during thia period a source of presaure on the
exchange rate, because of the developments 1n the balance of trade. In fact,
during 1990 some obaervers even felt that a revaluation should be put on the
agenda as the trade balance moved Snto conaiderable surplua (300-400 míllion
dollars monthly) during the periodtíarch-July. Monthly figures for the balance
of trade remained positive through October, but then turned sharply negative
with the December number an unaustainable 500 mlllion dollar deficit.
Given the large fluctuationa in domestic prices and real wages in Poland, it
is not so clear whether the fixing of the exchange rate contributed much to
stability during 1990, with one essential exception: the surpluses on
international trade allowed the country to build up its foreign exchange
reserves. Being able to díspose of a meaningful stock of international
reserves wili greatly increase the credibility and forecastability of future
monetary policy. If only because there are no substantial stocks of domestic
currency held outside the country, it makes little sense at present to
advocate purely floating exchange rate for the formerly socialist nations.
For, if their exchange rates are not fixed, there is likely to be a"managed"
float. In order to insulate the exchange rate somewhat over the short-term
from the latest balance of payments data, it will be helpful lf the
authorítíes have a stock of international reserves to smooth short-term flow
demands for hard currencies. Note, that this suggestion does not at all imply
squandering the international reserves on interventions to maintain an
overvalued exchange rate, the fatal mistake often made in Latin America!16
The Soviet experíences have ahown the costs in terma of greater uncertainty
of a lack of international reaerves. According to "The Economist" (March 16th,
1991): "As export revenues fall, increasingly desperate measures have been
needed to meet debt oblígations: 408 of Soviet firms' export earnings are
taxed to pay lnterest bills. Of the dollara they have left, 908 must be paid
into a special hard-currency fund controlled jointly by the central government
and the republics. These meeaures have wrecked the attractions for local
companies of internatíonal trade. Yet, drastic as they are, they are atill
inadequate."
Some Eastern European countries expect substantial credíts from international
organízations during 1991. It would seem attractive to add such capital
inflows to the lnternational reserves at the Central Bank and set up either
a managed float for the exchange rate or a system of very frequent auctions
of foreign exchange where companies and individuals could bid for hard
currencies. Such a system would seem to be preferable to directly allocating
scarce foreign exchange to business firms, because this will unavoidably lead
to a political bias in favour of large established companies and effectively
reduce the chances for new or smaller firms to obtain foreign exchange through
official channels.
In my view, the fíxing of the exchange rate of the Zloty in January 1990 has
not provided a nominal anchor to the Polish economy, but rather has served the
useful purpose of allowing Poland to buíld up a stock of international
reserves which will not only enhance the credibility of its future and nominal
policies but also contribute to an increase in business confidence. The
nominal anchor has not been provided so far by a fixed exchange rate; neither
can ít be derived from a money growth rule as, for ínstance, followed with
success by Germany, because the domestic demand for money is still too
unstable. Elsewhere I have recommended using indicators of nomínal wages as
the best available nominal gauge for the economy during the difficult
transitional period. S
The importance of nominal stability however strived for, is beyond doubt. A
necessary condition is sufficient credibility of the domestic money and no
S See E.J. Bomhoff, Currency Convertibility: When and How7; A
Contribution to the Bulgarían Debate, 1990, forthcoming, Kredit und Kapital.17
more than a very modeat role for foreign currenciea as nedium of transactiona
between domestic reaidents. In Poland at the end of 1989 a full 73 percent of
money held by householda and private enterprises consisted of foreign currency
deposíts with only 27 pezcent consíating of currency, demand deposits or
interest-bearing deposita in Zloty's. Such a reduced role for the domestic
currency suggesta lncipient hyperlnflation, because any addition to the
círculation of domeatic money through the printing press will be an ever
larger percentage of the outstanding stock of domestic currency if residents
continue to substitute hard currenciea for domestic money. Experience in
developed market econonies has shown that government revenues from seigniorage
can amount to 2-3t of gnp, but only if there is no large-scale currency
subatitutíon by domestic residenta. s There is no way in which a government
can finance 2-3 i of gdp through the printing press without incurríng a
hyperinflation if foreign currenciea already are more important than domestíc
currency in the economy.
In order to promote the role of the domestic currency, the Bulgarian Central
Bank has recently decíded to terninate the practice of selling luxury goods
for foreign currency only. In a very initial phase of economic líberalization
such special stores that only accept foreign currency may make some sense as
a means to attract foreign currency out of the black market into the open;
once the decision has been taken to move towards convertíbility of the
currency, the obvious aim of the monetary authorities will be to atrengthen
the role of the domeatic currency in all domeatic transactíons. In this
perspective, the decision to abolish the hard-currency requirement for the
purchase of luxury goods is sensible. Only after the domestíc currency has
established its dominant role in domestic transactions one can hope to achieve
a situatíon in which the demand for domestíc money stabilizes so that the
authorities can have more confidence in setting a path for the growth of a
domestic monetary aggregate.
Recent experience ín the Soviet Union has shown the debilitating effects of
uncertainty about taxation: which units of government are entitled to impose
taxesT 17hen such fundamental disputes are not resolved, central, regional or
e See R. Dornbusch: The European Monetary System, the Dollar and the Yen
in: The European Monetary System, edíted by Francesco Giavazzí, Stefano
Micossí and Marcus Miller, Cambrídge University Press, 1988, pp. 23-47.ia
local units of government will resort to increases in the relative pricea of
gooda and services they supply in order to make up shortfalls in their
budgeta. Hence, the sudden increasea ín pricee of energy, public transport
etc. which in part are symptoms of unreaolved conflicts about taxation.
Uncertainty in the area of taxation will also make it more difficult to show
both domestic resldenta and potential foreign investora that a deflnite break
has been made with the past as far as the style of government is concerned.
It ís crucial that the formerly aocialiat nations show that decisiona relating
to individual citízens or corporationa are subject to the rule of law and no
longer depend on individual negotiationa as in the past. A market system
requires stríct adherence to the rule of law in all areas relating to business
decieion-making, aince otherwiae forward planning becomes imposaible and
corruption wlll not be reduced.
Promotlon of the rule of law ia also important for more general reasons.
Several obaervers have pointed out that citizena and corporations in Central
and Eastern Europe experience the need to reflect on the morals appropriate
to a market society. According to the "Financial Times" (April 13, 1991) "Many
Poles only now underatand the true neture of the corruption that was an
essential part of the communist system. The authorities wanted people to
cheat, lie and steal because it allowed the possibility of locking up
troublemakers on the basis of the ordinary criminal code, rather than for
clearly political offenses. Today there is growing recognítion that the state
is not "theirs" any more but "ours". However, when an acquaintance went to the
tax office in Warsaw to declare, for the first time, his foreign earnings, an
official asked him why on earth he was bothering."
Government should set an example by showing that the rule of law governs
commercial affairs and that businessmen do not need to negotíate wlth scate
officials about access to foreígn exchange, their tax liabilities or any other
issues with legal and fínancíal aspects. A necessary (but not sufficíent)
condition is a clear tax system that outlines the rights of different units
of government to impose and collect taxes.
Finally, events in both Poland and East Germany have clarified what commercial
bankers can and cannot do. Commercial banks provide credit at a fixed rate of19
interest implying that if the enterprise or individual to whom they lend has
greater-than-expected success, they do not share in such a favourable outcome.
Because of this limited "upside" potential, banks can also not afford to
suffer more than the occasional losa of principal. Nence, commercial bankers
will always require collateral (security) to the full extent of their
expoaure. It therefore would be unrealiatic to expect commercial banks to
provide finance on the basis of a business plan drawn up under conditions of
extreme uncertaínty regarding future movements of prices, wages, domestic
demand and the exchange rate, without offering the security of assets that
have a likely liquidation value at least equal to the credit provided.
Both the privatization of state enterprises and the start of new companies
therefore requirea that management takes a significant stake in the company
and offers its personal assets as collateral for the purchase of shares. In
a country like Bulgaria in which many people own their homea, private
reaidences can be pledged as collateral; otherwise managers should accept that
their wages over a 3-6 year period would be reduced in order to pay for the
purchase of their ahare in the company. In case domestic residents do not
posseas the wealth required to offer collateral for the purchase of company
sharea, government should consider rapid denationalization of the housing
stock and of agricultural land in order to provide its citizens with more
collateral. The realistic alternative would be to induce foreign investors to
pledge part of their wealth as collateral for purchase of sígnificant stakes
in domestic companiea. Under all circumstances it would appear unrealistic to
aspect commercial banks to províde credit for the purchase of shares in
privatized companies unless security up to the amount of the loan is provided.20
Table 1: Tareets and Outturns. Pland 1990
Tareet 1990 Realization 1990
Inflation
Dec. 1990 over Dec. 1989 (e) 95 250
Real wagea (8) -10 -28
Prlvate consumption (8) - 6 -24
Industriel production by state - 5 -25
enterprises (8)
Cross domestic product (8) - 5 -12
Unemployment (min.) 0.4 1.1
Government budget deficit - 3.5 - 0.9
(billions of 21oty's)
International trade surplus - 0.8 - 3.8
in hard currency (billions of
U.S. dollara
Sources: C. Kolodko, Po roku i po szoku, Zucí Goapodarcze, nr. 2, 1991
M. Misiak, Rok Balcerovicza, Zycie Gospodarcze, nr. 6, 1991; Statystyka
Poleki, nr. 2, Rzeczpospolita; February 2, 1991. as reported in: G. Bíessen
and M. Bos-Karczewaka, The Polish transitíon (ín Dutch), Economisch
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